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PRIVACY V. PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS: DO 
CLOSED HEARINGS PROTECT THE 
CHILD OR THE SYSTEM? 
JAN L. TRASEN* 
. the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither 
the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and 
regenerative treatment postulated for children. 
Kent v. United States, 1966.1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
S.E., a fourteen year-old girl, is now home with her grandmother. 
Mter five years in the foster care system, during which she called eight 
different foster placements and institutions "home," a protracted court 
battle recently resulted in the return of S.E. to the grandmother who 
had raised her since infancy.2 The facts of S.E.'s case, which include 
allegations of child neglect and agency ineptitude, are unremarkable 
in the annals of family court proceedings.3 What is noteworthy, how-
ever, is this grandmother's effort to gain public access to dependency 
hearings through her federal court challenge to the Court Closure 
provision of the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act.4 
Sylvia Ernst, the maternal grandmother of S.E., raised S.E. since 
age two, when S.E.'s mother abandoned her.5 S.E. proceeded to attend 
six different schools before the age of eight, and concern for her 
behavior and truancy prompted Children and Youth Services of Ches-
ter County, Pennsylvania (CYS) to file a petition against Ernst, alleging 
* Editor in Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
I Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
2 Sandy Bauers, Fighting to Lift Veil on Child Welfare, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 15, 1993, 
at E1. The child, S.E., was found to be a dependent of the state in May 1988, and she remained 
in the foster care system until late April 1993. Ernst v. Children & Youth Servs., No. CIV.A.91-
3735, 1993 WL 343375 at *1 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 3, 1993). 
3 The vast majority of family court business-child protective proceedings, foster care reviews, 
custody cases, juvenile delinquency determinations-is frequently not recorded in state reporters, 
even at the appellate level. 
4 Ernst, 1993 WL 343375 at *1. 
5 [d. 
359 
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neglect.6 A finding of prima facie dependency at an emergency hearing 
in May 1988 resulted in S.E.'s placement in a psychiatric institution for 
a complete psychiatric and psychological evaluation.7 Two weeks later, 
S.E. was officially determined to be dependent, and was ordered to 
remain in CYS custody for thirty additional days of psychiatric treat-
ment. She was then placed in foster care.s 
And so nine year-old S.E. entered what would become an ex-
tended journey through the foster care agencies and institutions of 
Chester County, Pennsylvania-a journey from which she would not 
emerge until the age of fourteen. Although the reuninification of S.E. 
with her grandmother was the articulated goal of both parties, S.E. was 
shuffled from foster home to foster home, and from group home to 
institution, as the courts tried to do what was in her "best interest.',g 
During the following five years, over twenty evidentiary hearings were 
held in the Chester County courts, including regular administrative 
review hearings, as well as those held at the request of Ernst or CYS 
officials.lO In addition, Ernst unsuccessfully challenged the continu-
ation of dependency in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, and was 
twice denied certiorari by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,u 
At each hearing CYS questioned Ernst's parenting skills, and each 
time CYS determined that Ernst's aggressive behavior toward agency 
6Id. at *2. 
7Id. 
SId. Within this Note, the terms dependency and child protective proceedings are used inter-
changeably to refer to the civil hearings that typically occur within a state's Family Court or 
Juvenile Court system. A determination of dependency, in which the child is adjudged a depend-
ent of the state, may be the result of a finding of abuse or neglect within the home. See WALTER 
O. WEYRAUCH ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND CHANG-
ING HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 950-52(1994). The remedies offered by these courts are limited to 
protective measures: temporary removal from the home, placement in foster care, termination 
of parental rights, and changes in custody. See id. Criminal actions against the perpetrators of 
child abuse and neglect-which must be pursued by the local District Attorney in a separate 
action-are beyond the scope of this Note. See BARRY KRISBERG &JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 52 n.5 (1993). 
9 Ernst, 1993 WL 343375 at *3. The child's "best interest" is the generic standard considered 
by juvenile court judges, case workers, city agencies, and the child's guardian ad litem to best 
represent a child's needs during protective proceedings. See WEYRAUCH, supra note 8, at 840-42. 
See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (rev. ed. 
1979). 
10 Ernst, 1993 WL 343375 at * 3. 
II Id. In these actions, Ernst challenged the dependency determination by alleging that CYS 
had relied on false information in its initial dependency petition, including an exaggerated 
number of school absences attributed to S.E., and a mistaken allegation that S.E. had been in 
the care of Nassau County Children and Youth Services when the two had previously lived in New 
York. Id. at *2. These challenges to the dependency determination were ultimately dismissed in 
the federal case, due to the statute of limitations. Id. at *3. 
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workers was, itself, sufficient to preclude the reunification of the grand-
mother and child. 12 Several frustrating episodes, including periodic 
suspensions of Ernst's visitation rights at S.E.'s placements and her 
ejection from one evidentiary hearing,13 led Ernst to commence her 
federal court action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in mid-
1991.14 While this action was pending, S.E.'s dependency case finally 
came before a newly assigned Chester County judge; on April 26, 1993, 
this judge issued an order returning S.E. to Ernst's physical custody, a 
full five years after S.E. had been placed into the system. IS 
Sylvia Ernst was outraged over the system's delays and mistakes in 
her granddaughter's case. Ernst alleged numerous instances in which 
case workers had signed and approved reports without reading them, 
and in which juvenile court judges had mechanically approved extensions 
of S.E.'s foster placement without ever verifying whether hergrand-
mother had complied with court-ordered parenting classes.16 Ernst's 
anger was fueled by her impression that the child welfare system was 
using court closure as a device to avoid public scrutiny, by keeping the 
public ignorant of activities within the system.17 Ernst believed that if 
the media had been permitted to witness what was transpiring in S.E.'s 
case, S.E. might have been returned to her custody sooner, thereby 
averting the "child welfare tragedy"18 that the case ultimately became.19 
Ernst's decision to challenge the court closure provisions of Pennsyl-
vania's Juvenile Act thus revived an old debate: do the privacy laws, 
which are intended to protect children, effectively serve to protect 
12Id. That CYS may have been baiting Ernst, and provoking her to act in a way which would 
preclude reunification with her granddaughter, was noted by the court. See id. at *94 n.32. 
13Id. at *6. 
14Id. at *7. Ernst initially brought this action pro se under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for damages 
and injunctive relief, claiming a constitutional civil rights violation of her custodial rights to her 
granddaughter. She also challenged the constitutionality of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 6336(b), 
which governs the closing of juvenile courts. Id. 
Id. 
15Id. The court's opinion included the statement: 
The Court believes that not only is unification in this family desirable, but it is 
essential. We have come to the point where state intervention in [S.E.'s] life is now 
doing more harm than good .... Not only are [S.E.'s] best interests served by being 
with [her] grandmother, I find there is now no 'clear and convincing evidence' that 
[S.E.] at her present age and maturity, should be in the physical custody of the state 
rather than in the physical custody of her natural grandmother. 
16Id. at *3. 
17 See Bauers, supra note 2, at E2. 
18 See id. Thomas Curran, of the Defender Association of Philadelphia's Child Advocacy Unit, 
used these words to describe S.E.'s case and the agency's conduct when he was called as an expert 
witness for Ernst. Id. 
Ig See Ernst, 1993 WL 343375 at *1. 
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agencies from accountability to the public for their mistakes? Although 
juvenile courts have traditionally been closed to the public and the 
media, especially in protective and dependency proceedings,20 a grow-
ing number of critics assert that these hearings have the potential to 
become "little more than kangaroo courts, where judges rubber-stamp 
agency requests"21 without proper consideration. In cases such as S.E.'s, 
in which children are jostled through a system of ever-changing goals,22 
personalities,23 and standards,24 supporters of open courts believe that 
media exposure might force officials to act more consistently and 
responsibly in individual cases.25 Increased public awareness of the 
child welfare system might also encourage heightened public scrutiny 
of the system, as well as an understanding of the system's limited 
resources.26 
This Note suggests that, as long as the public and media respect 
the privacy rights of children, a qualified form of public access to the 
juvenile court system would serve the best interests of children. Part II 
presents an overview of the constitutional right of public access to 
criminal trials27 and the criteria considered by courts when deciding 
the issue of access to other types of trials.28 Part II also addresses the 
dangers of prior restraint inherent in any sort of conditional access 
policy. Part III discusses the history and philosophy of the juvenile 
justice system and the rationale behind the traditional policy of closed 
hearings.29 Part IV examines the manner in which juvenile courts have 
20 See infra Part III for a discussion of the background of confidentiality in the juvenile court 
system. 
21 Bauers, supra note 2, at E2. 
22 Chester County CYS repeatedly changed the goal in S.E.'s case from family reunification 
to long-term foster care; this kind of inconsistency makes quick resolution of cases like S.E.'s 
almost impossible. Ernst, 1993 WL 343375 at *3-4. 
23 During the Ernst proceedings, one agency worker was removed from the case for inappro-
priate conduct and personal involvement in the matter. Id. at *94 n.32. 
24 See Bauers, supra note 2, at E2. Ira Schwartz, dean of the School of Social Work at the 
University of Pennsylvania notes that in "the curious area of neglect," different agencies use 
different thresholds to warrant removing children from their homes. See id. Schwartz asks, "Do 
we know the difference between poverty and neglect?" Id. 
25 Bauers, supra note 2, at E2. 
26 See generally Gilbert Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 
101 (1958); Stephan Jonas, Press Access to the Juvenile Courtroom: Juvenile Anonymity and the First 
Amendment, 17 COLUM.J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 287 (1982); Note, The Public Right of Access toJuvenile 
Delinquency Hearings, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1540 (1983). 
27 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558 (1980). 
28 The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue of public juvenile trials, or whether 
juveniles have a fundamental due process right to keep their hearings private and closed to the 
public. 
29 Because the Supreme Court has not spoken, state courts differ in their treattnent of the 
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addressed public access in delinquency cases, and suggests that similar 
qualified access to dependency hearings would benefit both children 
and the public.30 Part V concludes that a policy of qualified access to 
juvenile dependency hearings, if carefully monitored, would benefit 
both the children within the child welfare system, and the system itself. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS 
A. A Brief History of Public Access to Criminal Trials 
In 1980, the Supreme Court recognized that the public and press 
have a First Amendment right to attend criminal court proceedings.3l 
The Court reasoned that the purpose of the freedom of expression 
guaranteed by the First Amendment32 is to arouse open discussion of 
public affairs, and to encourage the participation of citizens in self-gov-
ernment.33 Since the "Freedom of the Press" clause of the First Amend-
ment has been construed to grant the media a constitutional right of 
access to newsworthy information which is controlled by the govern-
ment,34 any rules that infringe on press access are subject to strict 
scrutiny.35 In deciding Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia in 1980, a 
plurality of the Court discussed this country's historical tradition of 
open and public trials, as well as the several public policy interests 
promoted by that tradition. 36 Richmond Newspapers arose out of a mur-
der trial in which the trial judge had granted the Commonwealth of 
issue of qualified or conditional access to juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., In re Katherine B., 596 
N.YS.2d 847, 851 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that there is no presumptive right of access to child 
protective proceedings and that the determination is at the discretion of the court); In re T.R., 
556 N.E.2d 439, 450 (Ohio 1990) (holding that there is no presumption of openness in juvenile 
court, and that the press has no qualified right of access), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990); Edward 
A. Sherman Publishing Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1258-59 (R.I. 1982) (holding that since 
the press has no constitutional right of access to juvenile proceedings, Rhode Island statute 
restricting access is valid). But see In re Hughes County, 452 N.W.2d 128, 131 (S.D. 1990) (holding 
that the press has a qualified right of access to juvenile hearings, and thus the court can close 
juvenile proceedings only after balancing the state's interests against the rights of the press). 
30 Most juvenile courts have jurisdiction over dependency, abuse, neglect, and adoption 
proceedings, as well as violent crimes committed by juvenile delinquents. 
31 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580. 
32 The First Amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press ... " U.S. CON ST. amend. I. 
33 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (citing Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
34 See id. at 604. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text for further discussion on the 
Supreme Court's discussion of Globe Newspaper. 
35 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607. 
36 448 U.S. at 570. The plurality traced the tradition of public trials back to the English legal 
system, which encouraged public participation and attendance at criminal trials. Id. at 565-66. 
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Virginia's motion to close the proceedings to the press and public.37 
The trial court denied the newspaper company's motion to vacate the 
closure order, and on appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affir-
med.38 The United States Supreme Court reversed, allowing the news-
paper access to the highly controversial murder trial,39 
The Court emphasized that open trials not only ensure fairness, 
but also promote public support for both the judicial process and for 
its results.40 In addition, because it is unrealistic to expect large num-
bers of citizens to attend criminal proceedings, the Court acknow-
ledged that the press often acts as the public's surrogate by attending 
trials and reporting to the public on the proceedings.41 Although the 
Court recognized this constitutional right of access to criminal trials, 
it also acknowledged that this right is not absolute.42 Courts may, within 
their discretion, exclude members of the press and public from a trial 
if "an overriding interest articulated in findings"43 outweighs the pub-
lic's right of access.44 
The Court stated two years later in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court that courts can justify closure only by a showing of "compelling 
governmental interest," and that the closure order must be "narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest. "45 In Globe Newspaper, the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts argued that the Massachusetts mandatory clo-
sure statute, which closed the courtroom during the testimony of 
According to the Court, "presumptive openness" is a necessary part of a trial because it promotes 
justice. Id. at 567. 
37Id. at 559-60. 
38Id. at 560-62. 
39Id. at 580. Although the murder trial had concluded by the time the First Amendment 
decision was issued, the Court stated that the question was not moot, and held that the right of 
access existed. Id. at 563. 
40 Id. at 571-72. "People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, 
but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing." Id. at 572. 
41 Id. at 573. Although the plurality found that the rights of the press were coextensive with 
the public's right of access, Justice Brennan stated that the question of whether the press has 
greater access rights than the public remains unsettled. Id. at 586 n.2 (Brennan,]., concurring). 
42Id. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion). 
43Id. (plurality opinion). 
44 Factors that might outweigh public access in the discretion of the court include the 
impairment of a fair trial, restrictions to ensure a quiet and orderly setting, and the protection 
of the defendant's constitutional rights. See, e.g., San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Social 
Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 338 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that "the right of access 
does not extend automatically to every proceeding in court"); In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 847 
(Utah App. 1989) (holding that "[tlhe right of public and press access is not absolute ... and 
may be denied ifit is 'shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, 
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.'" (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 
457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982»). 
45 457 U.S. 596, 606--07 (1982). 
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juvenile victims of sex crimes, was justified by the state interest in 
protecting these victims from further psychological damage.46 The Com-
monwealth also asserted that it had a compelling state interest in 
encouraging victims to report and testify in court about these crimes, 
and that it was necessary to deny public access to the trials during the 
testimony of these minors to satisfy these interestsY Applying a strict 
scrutiny analysis, the Court struck down the Massachusetts statute, 
holding that the state's interests were not compelling enough to justify 
a blanket exclusionary rule.48 Because the trial court is expected to 
balance the state's interest in closure against the public's First Amend-
ment right of access on a case-by-case basis, the Court found a manda-
tory courtroom closure statute to be overly broad.49 
In 1984, the Supreme Court extended the right of public access 
to the jury selection process of criminal trials in Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise /),50 holding that an open 
trial is essential for the appearance of a fair triaPl The Court also 
ventured that the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the 
consequences of criminal acts, and especially in knowing what happens 
to persons accused of violent crimes.52 In 1986, the Court extended the 
First Amendment right of access to preliminary hearings in Press-En-
46 Id. at 607. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 608-10. 
49 Id. at 608-09. The Court did suggest, however, that alternate means might prove effective 
in protecting the interests named by the state. An individualized approach that considers criteria 
such as the minor victim's age, maturity, wishes regarding privacy, and the nature of the crime 
might provide helpful information to courts in their balancing process. Id. This type of case-by-
case determination would guarantee the First Amendment right of access to the press and public, 
unless the state's justification was, in the words of Justice Brennan's majority opinion, "a weighty 
one." Id. 
50 464 U.S. 501 (1984). Press-Enterprise I involved a lower court decision that prohibited the 
press from viewing the voir dire for a rape and murder trial in which the victim was a teenage 
girl. The trial judge supported the closure on the grounds that the defendant might not receive 
a fair trial if the press inhibited the jurors. Id. at 503. 
51 Id. at 508 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-71 (1980». 
"The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have 
confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free 
to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will 
become known." Id. at 508. 
Id. 
52 Id. at 508-09. The Court noted that 
"criminal acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern [and] out-
rage and hostility; this in turn generates a community urge to retaliate and desire 
to have justice done .... When the public is aware that the law is being enforced 
and the criminal justice system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these 
understandable reactions and emotions." 
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terprise CO. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise lI).53 The Court 
observed that the determination of presumptive openness should rest on 
whether the place and process have historically been open to the press 
and public, and whether public access plays a significant and positive 
role in the functioning of the process.54 The standard established by 
the Court in Press-Enterprise II, a test of "experience and logic," was 
essentially a compilation of its previous decisions in Richmond Newspa-
pers, Globe Newspaper, and Press-Enterprise [55 If a court proceeding 
passes this test of experience (this type of trial has been historically 
open to the public), and logic (public access would playa positive 
role), a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches, and 
the proceeding is presumptively open to the press and public. This 
right of access is not absolute, but the presumption of openness may 
only be overcome by an overriding interest in a closure that is held to 
be "essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest. "56 
B. Conditional Access to Trials and the Problem of Prior Restraint 
Because the Supreme Court has not yet found there to be a 
constitutional right of access to juvenile court, a court's discretionary 
ruling to employ closure of a juvenile courtroom is subject to a lesser 
standard of review.57 Whereas a few state statutes close all juvenile 
proceedings to the public,58 others grant access but prohibit the dis-
53 478 u.s. 1 (1986). In Press-Enterprise IL the State of California moved to release the 
transcript of a closed preliminary hearing to the public. Id. at 4-5. The Superior Court had 
previously granted the defendant's motion to close the preliminary hearing in order to protect 
his right to a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 3-4. An enormous amount of publicity had already 
been generated in this murder trial of a nurse accused of administering fatal injections to twelve 
of his patients, and the Superior Court and the California Supreme Court both denied the state's 
motion to release the transcript. Id. at 3-6. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the speculation that publicity might deprive the defendant of a fair trial was not sufficient 
to overcome the public's First Amendment right of access to preliminary hearings. Id. at 15. 
54Id. at 8-9. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. at 13-14. 
57 The California Court of Appeals recently stated that if a constitutional right of public access 
to juvenile courts exists, then the courts may not exclude the public absent a showing of an 
overriding compelling state interest for closure, in which case an order of exclusion must be 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. 
Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 336 n.4 (Ct. App. 1991). If, however, as in San Bernardino 
County, the court finds no constitutional right of access, then states may develop different rules 
for access to those proceedings without a balancing of constitutional rights. Id. 
58 See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:34 (1994) (allowing only parties, witnesses, and 
counsel to attend); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-302 (Michie 1994) (excluding the general public from 
all juvenile court hearings). 
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semination of details that might identify the minor or the minor's 
family. 59 Although this kind of restriction on the freedom of the press 
may serve to protect a juvenile's anonymity,60 it may also create prob-
lems of prior restraint. Even though prior restraints are not unconsti-
tutional per se, they carry a "heavy presumption" of unconstitutional-
ity,61 and must be supported by the highest form of state interest.62 
Although the Court has acknowledged a state's interest in protecting 
the anonymity of juvenile victims and defendants, it has struck down 
state legislation which was found to impose a prior restraint in order 
to accomplish that goa1.63 In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 
the Court held that because a juvenile court judge had permitted the 
media to attend a juvenile hearing, it was unconstitutional for the 
judge to restrain the publication of truthful information obtained 
there.64 Once information is "publicly revealed" or "in the public do-
main," a court cannot constitutionally restrain its publication or distri-
bution.65 
In an effort to keep confidential the identities of litigants, some 
states have implemented criminal sanctions rather than prior restraints. 
These statutes, however, have been similarly scrutinized by the Court.66 
Since 1975, the Supreme Court has found unconstitutional the placing 
59 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(e) (1992) (granting courts discretion to admit the 
press, but barring the press from disclosing the minor's identity); 705 ILL. COMB. STAT. ANN. 
405/1-5 (West 1992) (giving the court discretion to prevent the press from disclosing the minor's 
identity). 
60 See infra Part III for a discussion of the goals of the juvenile system regarding confiden-
tiality. 
61 E.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (invalidating an 
order enjoining supporters of segregated housing from distributing leaflets as an unconstitutional 
prior restraint of speech). 
62Id; see also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (finding unconstitu-
tional a court order that restrained the press from publishing confessions or admissions made by 
the accused in a multiple murder trial). "Once a public hearing had been held, what transpired 
there could not be subject to prior restraint." Id. at 568. 
63 Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977). 
64 Id. In this trial of an eleven year-old boy charged with delinquency by second-degree 
murder, the juvenile court granted the press and public access to the proceedings, even though 
such proceedings were traditionally closed to the public. Id. at 309. The Court invalidated the 
pre-trial order issued by the juvenile court, which had prohibited any further use of the boy's 
name or photograph, noting that there was "no evidence that [the media) acquired the informa-
tion unlawfully or even without the State's implicit approval." Id. at 311-12. 
65Id. at 310. 
66 E.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (finding invalid a West 
Virginia statute requiring the press to obtain approval from the juvenile court in order to publish 
the identity of a juvenile defendant); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 
838 (1978) (finding unconstitutional a Virginia statute that criminalized the publication of 
information regarding confidential proceedings before a state judicial review commission); Cox 
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of criminal sanctions on the truthful disclosure of information re-
vealed at a public trial.67 In Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, the 
Court found a Georgia statute that criminalized the publication of a 
rape victim's identity to be unconstitutional.68 Although the Court 
acknowledged that the statute was designed to protect the privacy 
rights of the victim and her family, the Court held that since the name 
of the victim had become known to the press and public through 
official court records, that information could not be constitutionally 
constrained.69 
Four years later, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court 
held that a West Virginia statute that prohibited the press from dis-
seminating information about a juvenile delinquent without the per-
mission of the juvenile court operated as an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on speech.70 Daily Mail involved a fourteen year-old boy who 
fatally shot a classmate at his junior high school in a West Virginia 
town. 71 The media learned of the shooting by its routine monitoring 
of the police band radio frequency, and obtained the name of the 
alleged assailant simply by asking various eyewitnesses.72 The Court 
held that each of these news-gathering techniques was lawful.73 The 
Court also held that the magnitude of the state's interest in protecting 
the identities of juvenile defendants was not sufficient to justify the 
application of a criminal penalty against the media.74 In addition, the 
Court found the statute to be unconstitutional because it was inade-
quate to accomplish its stated purpose of confidentiality.75 
The Court has broadly construed the constitutional right of public 
access to criminal trials, at least in part because these trials historically 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (finding invalid a Georgia statute that made 
it a crime to publish the name of a rape victim). 
67 See Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 496--97. 
68 Id. Justice White, speaking for the Court, reasoned: "By placing the information in the 
public domain on official court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded that the 
public interest was thereby being served .... States may not impose sanctions on the publication 
of truthful information contained in official court records open to public inspection." Id. at 495. 
69 See id. at 496--97; see also Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 838 (finding that the 
state's "interests advanced by the imposition of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justifY the 
actual and potential encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press which follow there-
from"). 
70 443 U.S. at 106. 
7I Id. at 99. 
72Id. 
73Id. at 104--05. 
74Id. 
75Id. The Court noted the failure of the statute to restrict any other media, other than 
newspapers, from printing the names of youths charged in juvenile proceedings. Id. at 105. In 
this case, three radio stations had announced the juvenile's name before the respondent Daily 
Mail had even published it. Id. 
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have been open to public attendance and media coverage.76 But what 
of proceedings that do not have a tradition of openness, or those that 
have a manifest tradition of confidentiality? The juvenile courts es-
pouse such a policy and history of confidential proceedings, therefore 
providing an appropriate arena in which court closure provisions can 
be tested. 
III. THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM 
A. History and Philosophy of the Juvenile Court System 
The American juvenile court system evolved in most states at 
approximately the turn of the century.77 An outgrowth of the English 
Chancery Courts, which were charged with the protection of "wayward" 
or "delinquent children," America'sjuvenile courts were an important 
part of a broad reform movement intended to improve the welfare of 
children.78 Initially, the juvenile courts did not have jurisdiction over 
children accused of committing serious criminal acts; rather, once 
these juvenile defendants had reached the age of criminal responsibil-
ity,79 they were tried as adults.80 Reformers were concerned that the 
criminal justice system neglected the needs of youthful offenders by 
wantonly mixing them with hardened adult criminals, and, moreover, 
that the system did not afford these youngsters any opportunity for 
rehabilitation.s1 Juvenile court reformers believed that, instead of re-
habilitating these children, the system reinforced a negative environ-
ment and encouraged them to become outlaws.82Juvenile court reformers 
envisioned a system in which the emphasis would be on rehabilitation 
rather than punishment, on treatment rather than retribution.83 In the 
effort to produce a system that would be more "clinical" than puni-
76 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. (Press-Enterprise 11),478 U.S. 1,8--9 (1986). 
77BuREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION 
POLiCY: PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS 11 (1982) [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
INFORMATION POLiCY] (citing EDWARD ELDEFONSO, LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE YOUTHFUL 
OFFENDER 147 (3d ed. 1978». 
78Id. 
79 The common law considered children to have reached the age of criminal responsibility 
at age seven. Id; see also CHARLES E. SPRINGER, U.S. DEP'T OF jUSTICE,jUSTICE FOR JUVENILES 18 
(1986) (discussing different cultures' determinations of the age of criminal capacity). 
BOCRIMINALjUSTICE INFORMATION POLiCY, supra note 77, at 11. 
81Id. at 11-12. See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 17 (1993). 
82julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 106-07 (1909). "[The system] 
criminalized them by the very methods that it used in dealing with them." Id. at 107. 
83 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (noting that the juvenile court system, 
unlike other jurisdictions, is rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpus juris); 
see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLiCY, supra note 77, at 12-13 (discussing rehabilitative 
goals of early juvenile justice system reformers). 
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tive,84 the juvenile court system emerged as an informal, non-adversar-
ial system in which the State acted as parens patriae,85 rather than as 
prosecutor and judge.86 Court reformers ardently believed that soci-
ety's duty to the child could not be addressed by the concepts of guilt 
or innocence alone, but that society must discuss how the child had 
become an offender, and what must be done, both in the interests of 
the child and of the state, in order to save the child from "a downward 
career."87 In this atmosphere of guidance and rehabilitation, progres-
sive court reformers hoped that youthful offenders might emerge from 
the juvenile justice system reformed and ready to enter society free of 
the stigma of being former delinquents.88 
An essential component of this kinder, gentler juvenile justice 
system envisioned by reformers was an assurance of confidentiality 
within the system.89 The juvenile court system's efforts "to hide youthful 
errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard 
of the forgotten past"90 seemed crucial to the successful rehabilitation 
of juvenile offenders.91 Publishing the names of juvenile offenders was 
84 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). 
85 The term parens patriae literally refers to the role of the country or sovereign as parent; 
it is commonly used interchangeably with the terms in loco parentis and surrogate parent. BLACK'S 
LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 18. 
86 Kent, 383 U.S. at 555. In Kent, a sixteen year-Qld was charged with rape and several counts 
of robbery and housebreaking in the District of Columbia. Id. at 543. Because the juvenile court 
had waived its jurisdiction, the juvenile was tried in the district court, which found him not guilty 
by reason of insanity on the rape count, and guilty on the other counts. Id. at 546, 550. The 
Supreme Court held that the juvenile had been deprived of his constitutional rights to due 
process and the assistance of counsel, and that the waiver of jurisdiction was therefore invalid. 
Id. at 557-63. See generaUy Mack, supra note 82, at 107.Juvenile court reformers created a system 
in which the youthful offender would be "taken in hand by the state, not as an enemy but as a 
protector." Mack, supra note 82, at 107. Thejuvenile court judge would act "as a wise and merciful 
father handl[ing] his own child," and would decide each case according to the needs of the child 
and of the community. Id. 
87 Mack, supra note 82, at 119-20. Under the reformers' theory of juvenile justice, the child 
was considered to be essentially good, and was made "to feel that he is the object of [the state's] 
care and solicitude," rather than under arrest or on trial. Id. at 120. Juvenile proceedings were 
considered to be civil rather than criminal, and many of the rigidities of substantive and proce-
dural criminal law, such as due process, right to counsel, and trial by jury, were therefore 
discarded in the supposed best interest of the child. See id. at 120; see also Gault, 387 U.S. at 16; 
Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. 
88 See Mack, supra note 82, at 109. Juvenile justice reform included the notion that the child 
should be protected from a "brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to [the child] for life; to 
take [the child] in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it from 
the stigma." Id. 
89 See, e.g., Kent, 383 U.S. at 556 (noting that state statutes have historically shielded juvenile 
defendants from publicity). 
90 Gault, 387 U.S. at 24. 
91 See, e.g., San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. 
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considered to "seriously impair the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile 
justice system and handicap the youths' prospects for adjustment in 
society and acceptance by the public."92 In recent years, however, this 
confidentiality policy, like juvenile justice policy generally, has become 
the target of harsh criticism, as opponents have increasingly chal-
lenged the viability of the juvenile justice system.93 
B. Changes Within the Juvenile Court System 
During the past twenty-five years, the philosophy of the juvenile 
justice system has changed dramatically with the recognition that the 
specialized, non-adversarial proceedings traditionally afforded to chil-
dren have often served neither to rehabilitate them, nor to assure them 
of fundamental constitutional protections.94 As the juvenile court sys-
tem has grown to resemble more closely its adult criminal counterpart, 
the Supreme Court has begun to grant juveniles more of the constitu-
tional protections afforded to adult defendants facing similar charges.95 
Not until 1966 in Kent v. United States did the Court hold that minors 
have a right to due process and the right to representation by counsel.96 
The Court reaffirmed these determinations a year later in the case In 
re Gault, which also provided juveniles with a right to notice of charges 
against them, and a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.97 In 
1970, In re Winship held that juvenile courts must use the reasonable 
doubt standard to make a determination of guilt in criminal proceed-
ings,98 and five years later, Breed v. Jones held that juvenile courts must 
adhere to the double jeopardy protections of the Fifth Amendment.99 
In fact, one of the only constitutional protections not presently granted 
to juveniles is the unqualified right to a jury trial, which the Court 
expressly declined to grant in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania in 1971.100 In 
Rptr. 332, 340 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that embarrassment, emotional trauma, and stress caused 
by open hearings directly interfere with the goals of rehabilitation). 
92 Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1979) (Rehnquist,J., concurring) 
(quoting EDWARD ELDEFONSO, LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER (3d ed. 1978». 
93 See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 534 (1971) ("There has been praise for 
the (juvenile justice] system and its purposes, and there has been alarm over its defects."). 
94 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). "[T]here may be grounds for concern 
that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to 
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Id. 
95 CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 77, at 20. 
96 383 U.S. at 561-63. 
97 387 U.S. 1,31 (1967). 
98 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
99421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975). 
100 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury in 
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stepping back from its earlier decisions, which increasingly had granted 
constitutional protections to juveniles, the Court acknowledged that many 
of the "fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents ... 
have not been realized. "101 While conceding that the juvenile court 
"experiment" has proved to be a profound disappointment, the Court 
stated that the imposition of a jury trial would unduly impede the 
further evolution of the juvenile court system.102 
C. Confidentiality oj Juvenile Court Proceedings 
Even though the Court was reluctant to admit in McKeiverthat the 
juvenile court system is not accomplishing its rehabilitative goals, the 
past decade's climbing juvenile arrest and recidivism rates are a testa-
ment to the system's failure.103 Some critics argue that if the juvenile 
justice system is neither rehabilitating juvenile offenders, nor deterring 
them from committing criminal acts, then perhaps the protection 
provided by juvenile confidentiality is no longer warranted.104 These 
critics suggest that juvenile offenders are criminally responsible for 
their misconduct, and that by their actions they thereby waive their 
rights to privacy and anonymity.105 Other juvenile court critics and First 
Amendment advocates suggest that public access to juvenile courts can 
only improve a system shrouded in secrecy and plagued by inconsis-
tency, error, and limited resources.106 But what of abused or neglected 
children like S.E., who are ''wholly innocent of wrongdoing?" How does 
the juvenile court system). The Court noted, however, that it is the privilege of the states to install 
jury systems within their own juvenile court structures. Id. at 550. But see Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., 
The Right to a Publicjury Trial: A Needfor Today'sjuvenile Court, 76JUDICATURE 230, 233 (1993) 
(noting that only eleven states have instituted jury trials for juveniles, and advocating further use 
of the states' "privilege" to do so). 
101 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543-44. 
102 See id. at 544-46. 
103 See IRA M. SCHWARTZ ET AL., CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF YOUTH POLICY, UNIV. OF MICH. 
SCH. OF SOC. WORK, JUVENILE ARREST, DETENTION AND INCARCERATION TRENDS: 1979-1989, at 
3 (1991). The juvenile arrest rates for violent criminal acts increased 16% between 1985 and 
1989. Id. The juvenile arrest rates for property and other delinquent offenses increased 11 % 
between 1983 and 1989. Id. Juvenile justice experts also voice increasing concern over the 
disproportionate number of minority youth who are arrested and incarcerated for criminal acts. 
See KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 112-41 (discussing the influence of gender and race on 
the juvenile justice system). 
104 See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 77, at 109. 
105Id. 
106 See generally Gilbert Geis, Publicity andjuvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 
101 (1958); Stephan Jonas, Press Access to the juvenile Courtroom: juvenile Anonymity and the First 
il.mendment, 17 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 287 (1982); Note, The Public Right of Access tojuvenile 
Delinquency Hearings, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1540 (1983). 
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the law treat confidentiality in child protective proceedings, when the 
child is in no way responsible for the case being in court?107 
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether 
there is a First Amendment right of public access to juvenile courts, 
provisions vary from state to state. The vast majority of states have 
statutes within their juvenile codes that grant the juvenile court judge 
the discretion to admit or exclude the public from juvenile proceed-
ings. IOS These proceedings are typically closed unless a third party can 
show a "direct" or "proper" interest in the case.109 A crucial element in 
many states is whether opening the proceedings to the public is in the 
best interest of the child. llo In these states, if the court finds that 
publicity may have an adverse effect on the juvenile, the judge may 
grant a court closure order, although these orders are highly scruti-
nized. 111 A few states determine access to juvenile proceedings based 
107 See In reT.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 449 (Ohio 1990) ("The delinquent child is at least partially 
responsible for the case being in court; an abused, neglected, or dependent child is wholly 
innocent of wrongdoing."). 
lOS Thirty-nine states, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, grant judges the 
discretion to exclude the public and the press from juvenile proceedings. See infra note 109 for 
an overview of state statutes regarding public access. 
109 The statutes and court rules of thirty U.S. states, territories, and districts provide that 
courts may grant access to those parties having a "direct" or "proper" interest in the case. See ALA. 
CODE § 12-15-65(a) (1986); 17B ARIz. REv.Juv. CT. R. 19 (1988); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 
(West 1984); D.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-2316(e) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-28(c) (1994); HAW. 
REv. STAT. § 571-41 (b) (1993); IDAHO Juv. R. 22(b) (1994); 705 ILL. COMB. STAT. ANN. 405/1-5 
(1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 610.070(3) (Baldwin 1990); LA. STAT. ANN. CHILD. C. art. 407 
(West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (West 1975 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. 
§ 260.155(I)(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.171(5) (1986); NEV. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 62.193(1) (Michie 1991); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1043 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 27-20-24(5) (1991); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35(A) (West 1993); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 10, § 1111(A)(I) (1987 & Supp. 1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6336(d) (1982 & Supp. 1992); 
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 34, § 2208 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-30 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-755 
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1993); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.08 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-3a-33 (1992 & Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5523(c) (1991); V.I. CODE 
ANN. tit. 5, § 2517(f) (Supp. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE § 13.34.110 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 49-5-1 (d) 
(1992); WIS. STAT. § 48.299(I)(a) (1987 & Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-224(b) (1994). 
The juvenile judge typically grants press access on a case-by-case basis. This method, however, 
is inefficient and adds to the already backlogged juvenile court calendars. See infra Part IV for a 
discussion of this type of closure case. 
110 Five states will hold a closed hearing if the judge finds that it is in the best interest of the 
child or community. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.1O.070(a) (1992 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. 
§ 19-1-106(2) (1990 & Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-7-10(b) (Michie 1985); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 232.39 (West 1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A60(g) (West 1987). 
!II See supra Part II for a discussion of public access to criminal trials, court closure, and the 
problem of prior restraint. See also San Bernardino Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 
283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 345 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the court must recognize the importance of 
confidentiality in the juvenile court, while maintaining the value of open court proceedings); In 
re Katherine B., 596 N.Y.S.2d 847, 851 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that there is no presumptive 
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on the seriousness of the charge, under the theory that a juvenile 
charged with "adult crimes" such as murder and rape should be subject 
to any adult treatment the press and public wish to render.1l2 In chal-
lenges to these statutes, some jurisdictions have held that there is a 
legitimate public interest in the "proper disposition" of such violent 
crimes, regardless of the age of the accused offender. ll3 
Child protective proceedings, as compared to juvenile delin-
quency hearings, have been historically, and rather zealously, closed to 
the public and press by state courts.1l4 Although courts have reached 
these closure determinations carefully, with an emphasis on the best 
interests of children, this Note suggests that perhaps children are not 
the only parties being protected by these closed and secretive proceed-
ings. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR QUALIFIED ACCESS TO CHILD PROTECTIVE 
PROCEEDINGS 
The primary focus of the debate over public access to juvenile 
delinquency trials has been on the similarity of these proceedings to 
adult criminal trials. ll5 Several states have recognized that the public 
has a legitimate interest in access to information about violent crimes 
and their perpetrators, adult or juvenile.ll6 The policy arguments for 
right of access to child protective proceedings and that the determination is at the discretion of 
the court); In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 451 (noting that because juvenile court proceedings are 
neither presumptively open nor presumptively closed, the court must weigh the competing 
interests in favor of and against public access). 
112 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (West 1977 & Supp. 1992) (stating that the 
court shall exclude the general public from juvenile trials, except when a child is charged with 
first or second degree murder); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(1) (c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) 
(allowing for open hearings when it is alleged that a child has committed an offense that would 
be a felony if committed by an adult). 
113 See, e.g., News Group Boston, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 568 N.E.2d 600, 603 (Mass. 1991); 
see also E. Susan Garsh & Jonathan M. Albano, In the Matter of John Doe Grand Jury, News Group 
Boston, Inc. v. Commonwealth, BOSTON BJ., May:June 1992, at 5, 7 (noting that privacy interest 
of juveniles charged with second degree murder was secondary to the public interest in moni-
toring what happens to such juveniles in the court system). 
114 See, e.g., In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 451 (holding that a juvenile court may restrict public 
access to abuse and neglect cases if, after hearing evidence and argument on the issue, it finds 
that public access could reasonably harm the child or endanger the fairness of the proceeding, 
and that the potential for harm outweighs the benefits of public access); Edward A. Sherman 
Publishing Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1258 (RI. 1982) (stating that while the goal of an 
open trial is the protection of a defendant from prosecutorial or judicial abuse, the interests of 
the juvenile are most often best served by anonymity and confidentiality). 
I!5 See supra Part III C, discussing contemporary challenges to confidentiality in juvenile 
delinquency hearings. 
116 See, e.g., News Group Boston, 568 N.E.2d at 603; see also supra note 109 for examples of 
state statutes that permit open delinquency trials in cases of violent offenses or felonies. 
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and against public access to juvenile dependency proceedings are 
rather different. ll7 
A. Dependency Proceedings: A Stricter Standard of Confidentiality 
When Sylvia Ernst decided to challenge the Court Closure provi-
sion of the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, she began an uphill battle.ns 
Juvenile dependency proceedings have inherited a strong tradition of 
confidentiality, a tradition that state courts have upheld even more 
consistently than confidentiality in delinquency proceedings. ll9 Courts 
have concurred that in cases of child abuse or neglect, the interests of 
the public and the press rarely outweigh the privacy rights of the child 
and the family.120 Recently, in San Bernardino County Department of 
Public Social Services v. Superior Court, a California appellate court 
examined a highly publicized case of child abuse and neglect. 121 The 
court noted the history of closed dependency proceedings, and ex-
plained that judicial discretion must be directed at determining and 
enforcing that which is in the best interest of the minors involved.122 
The court stated that further emotional trauma and stress for the child 
would result from a public trial, and that this might interfere with the 
goal of her rehabilitation.123 
The Supreme Court of Ohio made a similar determination in the 
1990 case, In re T.R124 The court held that because there is no pre-
117 See supra note 8 for a discussion of the significance of, and remedies available for, a 
determination of dependency in child protective proceedings. 
118 See Ernst v. Children & Youth Servs., No. CIV.A.91-3735, 1993 WL 343375 at *1 (E.D. 
Penn. Sept. 3, 1993). 
119 See, e.g., San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. 
Rptr. 332, 338 (Ct. App. 1991); In reT.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 449 (Ohio 1990). 
120 See, e.g., San Bernardino County, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 345; In re T.R, 556 N.E.2d at 451; In re 
N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1989). 
121 283 Cal. Rptr. at 332. San Bernardino County involved newspaper access to the dependency 
hearings of seven minor siblings, initiated after allegations of abuse and neglect. Rose S., a ten 
year-old child, was reportedly found locked in a closet, where she had been kept by her parents 
for most of her life. Id. at 335. The Sun Newspaper, a party to this action, gained some national 
attention for its coverage of this dependency case, prior to the invalidation of its grant of 
conditional access to the courtroom. Id. 
122Id. at 345. 
123Id. at 340. 
124 556 N.E.2d at 451. This case involved custody actions brought separately by T.R.'s father, 
by the father's former wife, and by T.R.'s surrogate mother. Id. at 442. Each party sought 
permanent custody of the baby after the following events: the couple who had entered into the 
surrogate contract divorced, the surrogate mother realized that the adoption of T.R. had not 
been formalized, and genetic tests revealed to all parties that the father's sperm donation had 
not actually been used. Id. Both a closure order and a "gag order" issued by the Circuit Court 
were challenged, and the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the orders were overbroad and 
needed to be redrawn. Id. at 455. The Court noted, however, that no qualified right of access to 
this type of dependency proceedings exists. Id. at 449. 
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sumption of access to juvenile court, the judge must weigh the com-
peting interests for and against public access on a case-by-case basis.125 
Noting that the child in a dependency hearing is "wholly innocent," 
the court created a new standard: a juvenile court may restrict public 
access to its protective proceedings if, after hearing evidence and 
argument on the issue, it finds 1) that public access reasonably could 
be found to harm the child or endanger the fairness of the proceeding, 
and 2) that the potential for harm outweighs the benefits of public 
access.126 Regarding the fairness of the proceeding, the Ohio court was 
persuaded by the argument of the attorney for the child, who noted 
that the presence of the media would place the attorney in "an unten-
able position"127 when determining the evidence to present in her 
client's case. The court noted that counsel for the child would be 
forced to weigh the psychological harm to the child, T.R., posed by the 
disclosure of evidence, against the value of the evidence needed by the 
attorney to support her case.128 The Ohio Supreme Court stated that 
when an attorney must make strategic trial decisions based on the 
potential psychological harm to her client because of the presence of 
the public, then the fairness of the adjudication is endangered, and a 
court closure is justified. 129 
Recently, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court 
affirmed the notion that because there is no constitutional right to 
court access, the child's best interest should control the confidentiality 
of dependency proceedings.13o In re Katherine B. involved the kidnap-
ping of a ten year-old girl, a story which became the subject of a 
veritable media blitz in early 1993.131 The child, Katherine, was kid-
napped by an adult neighbor and imprisoned for sixteen days in an 
underground dungeon beneath his home, where he allegedly sexually 
abused her.132 When the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) 
intervened in the application for court closure, asserting a constitu-
tional presumption of openness to court proceedings, the Appellate 
125Id. at 451. 
126Id. at 449, 451. 
127Id. at 453. 
128Id. For example, psychological evaluations of each of the parties were to constitute an 
important part of the evidence presented at trial, but public disclosure of such intimate details 
had the potential to harm the child. Id. 
129 Id. 
130 In re Katherine B., 596 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (App. Div. 1993) (granting the guardian ad 
litem's and District Attorney's joint application for court closure, over the objections of the 
National Broadcasting Corporation). 
131 See id. 
132Id. 
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Division strongly disagreed. 133 The court cited provisions of the Family 
Court Act of New York which grant full discretion to the presiding 
family court judge to determine court closures.134 The court also relied 
on an uncontroverted affidavit submitted by a psychologist who had 
examined the child and expressed concern that an open trial would 
subject her to "feelings of embarrassment and shame" and the prospect 
of "re-victimization. "135 In addition, the Appellate Division considered 
the child's own affidavit, which seemed to serve as a poignant reminder 
of the interests at stake in child protective proceedings.136 
B. Dependency Hearings Should Be Open to the Public and the Press: 
Access in the Best Interest of the Child 
The rationale for keeping juvenile dependency proceedings con-
fidential is both commendable and well documented. Critics of these 
closed proceedings, however, note that the very confidentiality in-
tended to protect children, in effect, serves to protect social service 
agencies and the courts themselves from accountability to the public.137 
An historic dedication to the protection of juveniles' privacy rights has 
led to proceedings that seem secretive in nature, and which are rife 
with inconsistencies, improprieties, and judicial abuses.138 Arguments 
in favor of open dependency proceedings suggest that public access 
would achieve the following goals: to improve the system's fairness and 
effectiveness, to reduce judicial abuse and error, and to encourage 
improvement in the juvenile court system through greater public aware-
ness and involvement. 
l. Public Access and Fairness 
Public access to juvenile dependency proceedings would preserve 
the dual goals of ensuring fairness and giving the appearance of fair-
ness, both of which are essential to maintaining public respect for the 
133Id. at 849, 852. 
134Id. at 852. 
135Id. at 850. Dr. Anne Meltzer testified as an expert witness to the negative effects that 
substantial media coverage of the trial might have on Katherine. Id. 
Id. 
136 The affidavit of Katherine B. stated, in part: 
I Don't Want People To Know What HAPPEND TO ME, Because It's None of 
THERE BISINES ... If Everyone Saw MY Life on T.V. it wiLL Upset ME AAL-
LOOTT. Please Don't Put MY CASE On T.V, It's BBAADD Enough That It's In The 
Papers. Sinceriy, Katherine. 
137 See, e.g., Bauers, supra note 2, at El. 
13S See generally Stephan Jonas, Press Access to the Juvenile Courtroom: Juvenile Anonymity and 
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judicial process and its results. 139 The juvenile court system has been 
widely criticized for its inconsistencies,14O and public proceedings would 
serve to promote consistent standards, open to public scrutiny.141 
Public awareness of dependency proceedings might also function 
to protect abused and neglected children. When the court questioned 
the adoptive mother in the 1990 case, In re T.R, about her motives for 
issuing a home-made press release regarding the litigation, she can-
didly responded that "lacking money, power, [and] position," she con-
sidered media attention "her only trump card."142 This mother, like 
Sylvia Ernst, was willing to waive the confidentiality afforded juveniles 
and their families, hoping that the resulting media exposure would 
actually protect her child.143 In this sense, Sylvia Ernst suggested that 
a healthy dose of media attention might have raised some public 
concern about the plight of her granddaughter during the five-year 
period in which S.E. was shuffled around the bureaucracy of the child 
welfare system.144 Ernst and other critics believe that public access to 
dependency proceedings could promote a higher degree of fairness 
and effectiveness to the children involved in these cases.145 As T.R.'s 
mother noted, regarding the effects of publicity on her daughter, "She 
is never going to be harmed or have a hair on her head affected if 
millions of people are looking out for her best interest, as is her 
mother. "146 
the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 287 (1982); Note, The Public Right of Access 
to juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1540 (1983). 
139 Cf Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570-71, 580 (1980) (holding 
that there is a constitutional right to public access to criminal trials); Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1982) (holding that the state's interest in protecting minor 
victims was not compelling enough to justity a blanket closure provision). 
140 See, e.g., Tom Charlier, justice Abused, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Jan. 1988, at A15 
(discussing abuses and failures within the child welfare system). Douglas Besharov, the former 
director of the National Center for the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect, admits that there 
is a failure within the system to adequately screen reports, and that "the system often becomes 
overburdened and breaks down." Id. 
141 See San Bernardino Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 340 
(Ct. App. 1993); In reT.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 451 (Ohio 1990). 
142 556 N.E.2d at 454 (discussing the attempts of the "psychological mother"-that is, the 
mother who had adopted the baby and raised it-to "try the case in the media"). 
143 See id.; Ernst v. Children & Youth Servs., No. ClVA.91-3735, 1993 WL 343375 at *77 (E.D. 
Penn. Sept. 3, 1993). 
144 See Ernst, 1993 WL 343375 at *3. 
145 See id; see also Bauers, supra note 2, at E1-2. 
146 In re T.R, 556 N.E.2d at 454. The Ohio Supreme Court noted that although they criticized 
the appropriateness of this party's media campaign, it did not question the sincerity of her 
motives, nor her fitness as a parent for T.R. Id. at 455 n.12. 
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2. The Watch-Dog Role: The Reduction of Judicial Abuse and Error 
The non-adversarial and informal nature of juvenile court pro-
ceedings has led to wide criticism ofthese courts' methods and results. 
These critics note the high rate of judicial error in juvenile courts and 
a prevailing attitude of "casualness toward the law. "147 Supporters of 
open courts remark on the carelessness and cavalier attitudes they have 
observed among juvenile judges and court personnel.l48 Without pub-
lic scrutiny of the juvenile court system, the players within the system 
often become "petty tyrants," as one ACLU attorney and open court 
proponent notes. 149 Opening juvenile proceedings to public scrutiny 
might serve to "keep the judge under control,"150 and to deter inap-
propriate actions on the part of all participants. 151 As the Ohio Su-
preme Court noted in In re T.R., most judges are elected officials, and 
all are compensated through public funding; therefore, "the public has 
a right to observe and evaluate [their] performance in office. "152 Public 
access to the workings of the juvenile court would not only promote 
fairer and more professional proceedings, but would enhance public 
confidence in the judiciary. 153 
In addition to a concern for juvenile proceedings deteriorating 
into the realm of "kangaroo courts" for lack of public attention,154 
concerns for efficiency and safety demand a policy of public access to 
juvenile hearings. The lack of information about juveniles whose cases 
and records have been sealed may impair the ability of social service 
agencies to function effectively. 155 Juvenile justice and children's wel-
147 CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 77, at 113 (citing RL.R v. State, 487 
P.2d 27, 28 (Sup. Ct. Alaska 1971)). 
148 See Sanborn, supra note 100, at 236. 
149 See Bauers, supra note 2, at E2 (quoting Stefan Presser, legal director of the ACLU of 
Philadelphia). Presser notes that in a closed system, the "players ... know that there's not going 
to be any public scrutiny. So you often get a system which in the end, the ACLU thinks, works as 
much to the disadvantage to the young people as it works to their benefit." Id. 
150 Sanborn, supra note 100, at 236. 
151 See In re N .H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah App. 1989); see also Bauers, supra note 2, at E2. 
The Hon. James E. Lacey, a juvenile court judge in Detroit, notes that since Michigan enacted 
legislation requiring open juvenile courts, there has been a noticeable increase in professionalism 
among judges, lawyers, and case workers. Id. Judge Lacey muses, "In closed hearings, where the 
MSWs of the world-the masters of social work-are righting the wrongs, a lot of things happen 
that shouldn't happen." Id. 
152 In reT.R, 556 N.E.2d 439,453 (Ohio 1990). 
153 San Bernardino Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 341 (Ct. 
App. 1993); In re T.R, 556 N.E.2d at 450; In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 851 (Utah App. 1989). 
154 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,28 (1967) (noting that "under our Constitution, the condition 
of being a [child] does not justity a kangaroo court"). 
155 CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 77, at 113. 
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fare agencies generally advocate confidential proceedings, and yet 
their own efforts to coordinate their activities may be hampered by 
their lack of information. 156 Although child welfare personnel are typi-
cally exempt from court policies of confidentiality, most juvenile judges 
have full discretion to exclude from the courtroom all parties without 
a "direct" or "proper" interest in the case.157 Consequently, a judge's 
determination of these admitted parties may not encompass all of the 
social workers and agency personnel that actually work with the child, 
thus contributing to misinformation and delay. 
In addition, the secrecy within the juvenile court system, at its 
worst, can create a dangerous situation both for law enforcement and 
for the public.158 According to a Family Court Division official from 
Manhattan, "there is no way of telling how many times a kid carrying 
a loaded weapon has been picked up before on the same charge. And 
the kids all know it."159 State statutes prohibiting law enforcement from 
ordering photographs or fingerprints for most juvenile offenders also 
contribute to the problems created by confidentiality in the juvenile 
courts.160 These policies exacerbate the dangers created by court clo-
sure, and together they constrain the exchange of information be-
tween juvenile and adult law enforcement authorities, thus handicap-
ping the authorities and endangering the community.161 Additionally, 
156Id. 
157Id; see also supra note 109 for examples of state statutes regulating discretionary court 
closure based on these criteria. 
158 CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 77, at 114. See Jan Hoffman, Felon vs. 
Youth: Commission Prodding Family Courts to Look at Crime, Not Criminal's Age, N.Y. TiMES, Jun. 
25, 1994, at A27. 
159 Rita Kramer, The Assault onJuvenile Crime, WALL ST.]., Nov. 8, 1993, at 28 (quoting Peter 
Reinharz, head of the Family Court Division of New York City's Law Department). The state of 
New York continues to be one of the last holdouts against changing its juvenile code, which 
mandates the sealing of the names and records of all Family Court parties under age sixteen. Id. 
160 Bob Herbert, In America: 15 and Armed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, at E17. Because of a 
reluctance to stigmatize young offenders, New York authorities may photograph and fingerprint 
only juveniles accused of the most serious crimes-Class A, B, and C felonies, such as murder, 
forcible rape, and first-degree assault. Id. Ellen Schall, a former New York City Commissioner of 
Juvenile Justice, decries the cynicism of those who insist on fingerprinting young offenders, 
equating the opening of juveniles' records to admitting that ''we've given up on them." Hoffman, 
supra note 158, at A27. 
161 Herbert, supra note 160, at E17. In 1993, these confidentiality policies resulted in the 
release of fifteen year-old Shaul Linyear to his mother, after police apprehended him in the act 
of holding a loaded revolver to a man's head. Id. The juvenile was charged with illegal possession 
of a loaded weapon, a Class D felony, and menacing, a misdemeanor; the police were therefore 
not permitted to fingerprint or photograph him. Id. Two months later, this juvenile robbed and 
shot to death a delivery man in broad daylight and was charged as an adult. Id. The Brooklyn 
District Attorney discovered the prior arrest only because a Family Court employee who remem-
bered the juvenile court case happened to read about the murder in a newspaper and proceeded 
to call the District Attorney's office. Id. 
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in the "peculiar system" of juvenile law,I62 it is quite common for a child 
to have concurrent cases pending that involve both dependency and 
delinquency issues. I63 A system of public hearings would ensure that all 
interested parties had access to information on the full extent of the 
minor's situation. I64 
3. Public Awareness and Involvement in the Juvenile Court System 
Lastly, opening the juvenile court to the public and press would 
encourage public awareness and support for the juvenile system, which 
would ultimately serve the best interests of children. Although First 
Amendment challenges to court closure orders have generally been 
unsuccessful,I65 the spirit of the First Amendment certainly demands 
consideration in any discussion of public and press access to trials. The 
purpose of the First Amendment, after all, is to ensure open discussion 
of public affairs and to encourage the participation of citizens in their 
system of government. I66 Courts have widely recognized that the public 
has a legitimate interest in learning about and becoming involved in 
the juvenile court system.I67 The Supreme Court has also noted that 
even though the media has no greater right of access than do public 
citizens, citizens rely on the press to report on court proceedings; for 
this reason, media access to trials carries a heightened importance. I68 
In the context of juvenile dependency proceedings involving alle-
gations of child abuse or neglect, there is a cognizable risk that the 
child victim may be ''victimized again by the systems. "169 These systems, 
including child welfare, law enforcement, and the justice system, are 
notoriously understaffed and underfunded. I70 Poor training and low 
162 In reGault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967). 
163 For example, it is common for ajuvenile to be living in a foster placement due to abuse 
or neglect in his home, and also to be brought in on unrelated delinquency charges for assault, 
larceny, or narcotics. 
164 CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 77, at 114. "From the schoolroom to 
the police precinct, from the courtroom to the juvenile jail, secrecy so pervades the system that 
even officials who ought to be informed about a child's criminal conduct are kept in the dark." 
Id. 
165 See, e.g., San Bernardino Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 
343 (Ct. App. 1993); In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 450 (Ohio 1990); Ernst v. Children & Youth 
Servs., No. ClV.A.91-3735, 1993 WL 343375 at *8 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 3, 1993). 
166 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (citing Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
167 See, e.g., In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d at 451; In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844,849 (Utah App. 1989). 
168 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558 (1980) (noting that 
the press often act as the public's "surrogate" in gathering information on court proceedings). 
169 San Bernardino County, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (citing report by the Commission on the 
Enforcement of Child Abuse Law (April 1985)). 
170 See, e.g., Laura Shapiro et al., Rush to Jud{fmen,t, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19, 1993, at 57. Elizabeth 
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salaries have resulted in both a high turnover rate and a slow decline 
in the caliber of case workers. l7l Agencies compound the problem by 
scrambling to fill their depleted ranks with workers who are only 
negligibly qualified.172 These systemic problems may explain agency 
mistakes and misconduct, but should not excuse them. If the public 
was informed about how the juvenile system functions-and more 
importantly, does not function-this might prompt an "understandable 
community reaction of outrage and public protest"173 over the way 
children are suffering within the juvenile system. Stories abound of 
cases like S.E.'s, in which children are committed to the foster care 
system, only to emerge years later, after numerous agency errors and 
oversights have prevented them from timely reunification with their 
natural families.174 There are also far too many grisly stories of agency 
mistakes resulting in misguided family preservation plans-that is, the 
return of children to unsafe or abusive homes-without proper agency 
supervision or services.175 If the public had access to information about 
Vorenberg, president of the National Coalition for Child Abuse Reform, remarks, "This is a system 
that overreaches and gets jammed up." Id. "Children get placed in foster care when it may not 
be necessary, [and] cases of real abuse go undetected ... the system fails everybody." Id. 
171 See Charlier, supra note 140, at A13, A15. 
172 See id. at A13. In a 1987 survey by the National Child Welfare Resources Center, 75% of 
abuse cases were handled by workers without college degrees in social work. Id. Of those cases 
handled by college graduates, only 33% went to MSWs. Id. According to Douglas Besharov, the 
former director of the National Center for the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect, case 
workers do not receive adequate training on the job, either. Id. "Workshops and seminars ... are 
inadequate to teach workers how to interview children and assess allegations. Id. 
173 See San Bernardino Dep't of Pub. Social Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332, 342 
(Ct. App. 1993) (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980». 
174In Chicago, Patrick Murphy, the Cook County Public Guardian laments, "[these children] 
are getting screwed. And if you stick them with D.C.F.S. [the Department of Children and Family 
Services], it gets even worse. Will the kid go through twelve foster homes? Get beat up and maybe 
raped?" Susan Chira, A Defender of Chicago's Children Refuses to be Polite About Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 30, 1994, at E7. In New York, the state pays agencies an average of $18 for each day a child 
is in foster care. Celia W. Dugger, New Yom Develops Incentive to Reduce Time in Foster Care, N.Y. 
TIMES,Jul. 31, 1994, at AI. As in many states, the system sets no time limit for foster care; thus, 
there is actually a financial disincentive for agencies to move children out of foster care and into 
permanent homes. See id. Recent figures indicate that half of the 60,000 children in New York 
state foster care have been in the system for more than three years. Id. at A37. 
In addition, a recent audit of New York City'S Child Welfare Administration (CWA) revealed 
that the agency's tracking system is so disorganized that more than one in five foster children 
are listed in agency files at inaccurate addresses. Jonathan P. Hicks, Comptroller Audit Faults City 
Foster-Care Program: One Child in Five Listed at the Wrong Address, N.Y. TIMES,Jul. 4,1994, atA23. 
In fact, more than 2500 foster children are currently listed as residing at 80 Lafayette Street in 
Manhattan, which is actually the office building in which the CWA does business. Id. 
175 See Chira, supra note 174, at E7. Public Guardian Murphy recalls the story of one mother 
who did not vaccinate her child for measles; the child lost three fingers and his eyesight before 
she sought medical attention, and the mother never visited him in the hospital. Id. Another three 
year-old child was returned to the home of his abusive mother, pursuant to the state agency's 
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the backlog in child welfare cases and the toll that this takes on 
children, citizens might be motivated to make positive changes to the 
system.176 
In addition, the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the 
dispositions of horrific cases like the kidnapping case of Katherine B., 177 
or of the San Bernardino County case, where a young girl was locked 
in a closet for years by her parents. I78 Public access to these types of 
proceedings would serve "an important prophylactic purpose, provid-
ing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion."179 Lastly, 
public support is vital to the functioning of the judicial system in 
general, and to the juvenile court system in particular. 180 As one juve-
nile court judge has stated, if juvenile hearings remain confidential, 
')uvenile courts will be considered suspect and ultimately die-to-
gether with their specialized programs-for want of public support."181 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, Sylvia Ernst's challenge to the Pennsylvania court clo-
sure provision was defeated. Although she won nominal damages on 
some of her other procedural claims, her constitutional challenge to 
the statute failed for lack of proper standing.182 Her challenge to the 
juvenile court system, however, will not be disposed of so easily. Critics 
recommendation; she later hanged the child. Id. New York statistics show that twenty percent of 
foster children who are sent home are ultimately put back into foster care, due to additional 
abuse or neglect at the hands of their natural parents. Dugger, supra note 174, at A37. Clearly, 
so-called family preservation and family reunification policies are imperfect at best. 
176 See San Bernardino County, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 342. 
177 See In re Katherine B., 596 N.YS.2d 847, 848 (App. Div. 1993). 
178 See San Bernardino County, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 335. 
179Id. at 342 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980». 
180 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY, supra note 77, at 113. 
181 Hon. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a Place for 
Rehamlitation?25 CONN. L. REv. 57, 89 (1992). At a recent conference on juvenile justice, Judge 
Martin stated that it is "unrealistic" to admit the media on a limited basis. Judge Gordon A. Martin, 
Jr., Panelist at New England School of Law Juvenile Justice Conference (Oct. 20, 1994). However, 
Judge Martin noted that even if publicity would cause some damage to individual juveniles, "for 
the system to survive, we should show [the public] the good work we are doing." Id. 
182 Ernst v. Children & Youth Servs., No. CIV.A.91-3735, 1993 WL 343375 at *73-75 (E.D. 
Penn. Sept. 3, 1993). The court stated that third party standing may be allowed, depending on 
the relationship between the litigant and the third party, the ability of the third party to advance 
its own interests, and the compatibility of the litigant's and third party's interests. Id. at *74. 
Because Ernst had "no special relationship with the press or public," had not formed a class of 
the interested public, and because it was not clear that her interests were compatible with either 
the press or the public, the court held that Ernst lacked standing to raise the First Amendment 
challenge. Id. at *75. The court noted, however, that there is no obstacle preventing the press, 
itself, from challenging the same court closure provision in the future. Id. 
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of the child welfare system are becoming ever more vocal about its 
flaws and mismanagement, and the juvenile court system is realizing 
that it must clean its own house or risk going down with the system. 
Until the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right for the 
public and the media to attend juvenile trials, the First Amendment 
may not be the most practical means for attacking court closure poli-
cies. The spirit of the First Amendment, however, dictates that the 
more information the public has about its own court systems, the more 
likely it is that they will effectuate positive changes to those systems. A 
qualified form of public and press access to juvenile trials-which 
might include the privilege to watch and report, with the condition 
that no names be disclosed at the proceeding-would be a courageous 
step toward improving the system. Such qualified access to the courts 
would serve to maintain public awareness, to protect the freedom of 
the press to report on these proceedings, to protect children from 
further abuse by the judicial system, and to foster positive change 
within the juvenile system. 
It is acknowledged that this position may not be popular among 
children's advocates. The criticism of a sacred cow like juvenile con-
fidentiality is not likely to win many friends within the children's rights 
community. With a proper commitment from the media to operate 
according to the journalistic ethics of their own profession, however, 
qualified access to juvenile proceedings would ultimately serve the best 
interests of both the system and the children within it. 
